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exchange rate volatility in a broad cross section of countries.  For developing economies, 
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Section 1: Introduction 
What are the principal determinants of exchange rate volatility?  This has been 
perhaps the biggest research question in international finance over the last three decades.  
Despite hundreds of follow-up papers, the results of Meese and Rogoff (1983) suggesting 
that movements in exchange rates are largely unpredictable remain largely intact.    
Our paper also focuses on exchange rate volatility.  But we take an alternative 
perspective to the literature that has directly followed in the tradition of Meese and 
Rogoff.  Rather than focusing exclusively on the time series properties of exchange rates 
relative to a single large currency such as the dollar or the euro, we are concerned with 
understanding what drives bilateral exchange rate volatility across countries.  Looking at 
a large cross section of both developing and developed countries, we seek to identify the 
main determinants of bilateral exchange rate volatility between country pairs.  
Our starting point is the Optimal Currency Area (OCA) hypothesis of Mundell 
(1961).  Mundell isolated the key economic factors that make two regions or countries 
part of a common currency area.  These factors include trade interdependence and the 
degree of commonality in economic shocks
1.  As in previous work (e.g. Bayoumi and 
Eichengreen 1998, Hausmann et al. 2001, Larrain and Tavares 2000), we use these as 
explanatory variables in modeling bilateral exchange rate variability across countries.   
But in addition to the standard set of OCA variables, we add a further set of 
determinants measuring financial linkages between countries.  Recent theoretical 
literature suggests that these variables may be of key importance in understanding 
exchange rate variability, especially for developing economies.  Our central hypothesis is 
that for developing countries, high levels of financial linkages with a creditor country C  3 
(in the form of portfolio debt or bank loans) will, ceteris paribus, be associated with a 
lower level of bilateral exchange rate variability vis-￿-vis country C.  
This hypothesis is derived from a substantial recent body of work that points to 
the importance of financial factors in understanding exchange rates in emerging market 
economies.  Many writers have questioned the neglect of financial market structure in 
standard macroeconomic models.  Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) stress the 
importance of balance sheet effects in understanding the properties of business cycles.  
Among others, Krugman (1999), Cook (2000), Aghion et al. (2001), Cespedes, Chang 
and Velasco (2000, 2001), Devereux and Lane (2001), Gertler, Gilchrist and Natalucci 
(2001) and Eichengreen (2002), have extended these ideas to the open economy.  All 
these papers highlight a fundamental failure of the ￿Modigliani-Miller￿ theorem: balance 
sheet effects matter for macroeconomic outcomes and especially for the exchange rate.   
One conclusion of this literature is that, combined with these balance sheet 
effects, the presence of external debt (denominated in foreign currency) may have an 
important effect on the way in which movements in the exchange rate impact on an 
economy. Fluctuations in exchange rates, in the presence of large stocks of un-hedged 
foreign-currency denominated debt may be important through its effects on the financial 
sector and corporate balance sheets. This introduces a cost of exchange rate variability 
quite separate from the traditional theory.  Eichengreen and Hausmann (1999) suggest 
that many emerging market economies may have little ability to tolerate a high degree of 
exchange rate volatility against their major creditors.  The observation that many 
countries, especially emerging market economies, display a ￿fear of floating￿ (Calvo and 
Reinhart 2002) offers supporting evidence for the hypothesis that OCA factors alone 
                                                                                                                                                 
1 See also Alesina and Barro (2002).  4 
cannot provide a full account of the degree bilateral exchange rate volatility that 
emerging market economies experience
2.   
Accordingly, the central empirical hypothesis of the paper is that in addition to the 
standard OCA factors, bilateral exchange rate volatility is related to the stock of bilateral 
financial claims across countries. For the ￿rich￿ countries that are not constrained in 
international capital markets and can freely borrow by issuing assets denominated in their 
own currencies, it is unlikely that international balance sheet considerations have a large 
impact on their choice of exchange rate regime.  But for developing economies that are 
subject to various borrowing constraints and must issue debt in foreign currency, 
exchange rate volatility may have an extra cost, beyond that suggested by the standard 
OCA criteria.   Accordingly, we test the hypothesis that bilateral exchange rate volatility 
is especially negatively related to bilateral financial claims for developing economies.   
The paper begins by developing a simple model of exchange rate choice for a 
small open economy vulnerable to external terms of trade disturbances.  Exchange rate 
policy matters due to nominal price stickiness.  Our model allows for the exploration of 
two separate cases.  For an economy free of credit constraints, we show that exchange 
rate adjustment is desirable, and the exchange rate should respond to external shocks 
according to OCA theory.  We then show that the presence of credit constraints, in 
combination with external debt, leads to a significant decline in the optimal response of 
exchange rates to shocks.  If the credit constraints are significant enough, it may be 
optimal to have essentially no adjustment of the exchange rate in response to external 
shocks.  
                                                 
2 A related, but separate rationalization for ‘fear of floating￿ is provided by Caballero and Krishnamurty 
(2001).  They stress the importance of internal versus external collateral during a currency crisis.   5 
In our empirical estimates we examine the determinants of bilateral exchange rate 
volatility in a broad cross section of countries, using a number of standard OCA variables 
that have been employed in the literature, such as trade interdependence, differences in 
economic shocks, and country size.  We then add a series of financial variables.  One 
represents internal finance, capturing the degree of financial depth within countries.  A 
second set of variables measures external financial factors. One of these comes from 
banking data (obtained from the BIS), and represents exclusively creditor-currency 
denominated loans, so it captures the importance of foreign currency liabilities.  The 
second measure comes from the IMF￿s International Portfolio Survey, and represents 
bilateral portfolio debt liabilities between countries.  
Our empirical results find that financial variables do play a significant role in 
explaining exchange rate volatility, in addition to the standard OCA set of variables.  For 
the most part, the results indicate that the effect of OCA variables on exchange rate is 
consistent with standard theory.  Greater bilateral trade reduces bilateral exchange rate 
volatility, and economic size increases volatility.  This holds both for developed and 
developing countries.  For the full sample, bilateral exchange rate volatility is reduced by 
both internal finance and by external financial linkages.   
But the results are sharply different for developed economies and the developing 
country sample.  For developed economies, bilateral exchange rate volatility is either 
positively affected by external financial linkages, or affected insignificantly.  By contrast, 
for the developing country sample, bilateral exchange rate volatility is significantly 
reduced by external financial linkages.   Thus, the dichotomy between developed and 
developing economies suggested by the model is supported by our empirical results.  In  6 
fact, we see the same dichotomy with respect to internal finance; this variable tends to 
increase exchange rate volatility for developed economies, but reduces it for the 
developing economies.  
The paper is organized as follows.  The next section develops a simple model of 
the optimal exchange rate policy for a small economy, following in the tradition of the 
recent ￿new open economy macroeconomics￿ literature.  Section 3 outlines the data and 
the empirical strategy used in the paper.  Section 4 discusses the empirical results.  Some 
conclusions then follow.  
Section 2.  An illustrative model 
We first outline an illustrative model of optimal exchange rate volatility in a small 
open economy.  Here we give an intuitive description of its main elements. There is a 
single small economy, where all households are alike, consuming an imported good and a 
non-traded good, and supplying labor
3.  The economy produces a non-traded good and an 
export good.  Prices of both import and export goods are determined in the rest of the 
world, but non-traded goods prices are determined domestically.  
Household preference is separable in labor supply and aggregate consumption
4.   



















, respectively, where a is the weight on non-traded goods in 
aggregate consumption, and ρ  is the elasticity of substitution between import goods and 
                                                 
3 This is a very simple version of a ￿new open macro￿ model (see Obstfeld and Rogoff 1995, 2000, and 
Lane 2001).   












 . For simplicity, we focus on a static economy.     7 
non-traded goods.   N P  represents the non-traded good price, and M P is the import good￿s 
price.  The foreign currency price of import goods, 
*
M P , is determined abroad, so the 
domestic price must satisfy 
*
MM PS P = , where S is the nominal exchange rate. The 
household￿s implicit labor supply is given by  tt t t WP C H
σ ψ η = , where σ  and ψ  represent 
the inverse of the elasticity of inter-temporal substitution in consumption, and 
consumption-constant elasticity of labor supply, respectively. 
  Firms in the non-traded sector employ only labor ( N H ), using one unit of labor 
per unit of output.  Firms choose prices in advance to maximize expected profits.  
  In the export sector, firms must use both labor and an intermediate import good.  









, where  X VH =  represents value-added, equal to employment.  The 
export price is given by 
*
XX PS P = .  Intermediate imports are provided by a separate 
importing sector, at price Q.  Let  / X qQ P = . Then free entry in export goods implies 




−− = .                                   (1)      
  Firms in the intermediate input sector purchase inputs from abroad and sell them 
to exporters.  These firms may face credit constraints in the purchase of intermediate 
inputs.  The rationalization is as follows.  Intermediate importers initially borrow an 
amount 
* B  from foreign banks to finance the purchase of intermediate inputs. Then 
intermediate importers may purchase imports from the foreign suppliers at price 
* Q .   
Due to default risk, the intermediate importers are required to pay an extra ￿risk-
premium￿ per unit of imported intermediate inputs.  Following Bernanke et al (1999),  8 
assume that the risk premium is an increasing function of the amount borrowed, relative 
to net worth.  Thus, the total variable cost for the intermediate importing firm, in 
domestic currency terms, is given by 





ϕ ≡  denotes the ratio of 
borrowing to net worth
5.  Assume that net worth of the intermediate input sector is fixed 
in terms of the non-traded good, and therefore for simplicity we can normalize it to unity.  
The function  ( ) z ϕ satisfies ’( ) 0 z ϕ > .   
  The key feature is that the balance sheet position of intermediate input firms 
determines the sensitivity of the risk premium to the exchange rate. The elasticity of the 
















ϕς = , where ς  is a constant. Then it is clear that γ is increasing in ϕ .  For the 
rich economies, we would anticipate that ϕ  would be very small, and hence γ negligible.  
But for developing economies, we might expect higher values of ϕ and hence γ .    
  With free entry into the intermediate importing sector, the price of intermediate 
imports charged to export producing firms must then be 
                           
*(1 ( )) QS Q z ϕ =+                                            (2)  
  Without loss of generality, we take the exchange rate as an exogenous policy 
variable that can be chosen by the domestic monetary authority.  The only external 
shocks in the model are those to the terms of trade.  The terms of trade can be described 
                                                 
5 At the end of the period, the bond is repaid to the foreign creditor, so there are no net flows of capital into 
the country.   9 
as the export price, relative to a composite of import prices (prices of both consumer 
good imports and intermediate good imports).  Holding 
*
M P constant, we allow for shocks 
to 
*
X P  and to
* Q .   
  In equilibrium, output in the non-traded goods sector must equal demand 









.                                            (3)  
Equilibrium in the balance of payments requires that value added in the export sector 
equals imports 










 −− = − 

.                            (4) 
Finally, from the zero profit conditions in the export sector, combined with the 
equilibrium wage, and labor market clearing ( XN HH H =+ ), we get 




qP C H H
σ ψ ωη
ω
−− = + .                                  (5)   
Given the policy rule for the exchange rate, and the predetermined non-traded goods 
price, these three equations can be implicitly solved for consumption C , and employment 
in each sector,  X H  and  N H .   
  The model can be solved by linearizing equations (3) ￿(5) around an initial steady 
state.  Lowercase letters represent log deviations from the steady state, so that for any 
variable  X , let  ln( / ) xX X = .   From (3), we have  
                                (1 ) N ha s c ρ =−+ .                                    (6)               
Non-traded output is an increasing function of consumption and the nominal exchange 
rate.  From equation (4), using also (2) we have   10 
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  The left hand side represents the net value-added in the export sector, which 
includes the direct effects of the terms of trade shock, the effect of increased 
employment, and finally, the impact of the exchange rate on real income through a 
tightening of the credit constraint.  The right hand side of (7) then just represents changes 
in the demand for imported goods.  
  A linearization of  (5) gives  
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+− − = −++ + − .  (8) 
The left-hand side represents the change in the value of the marginal product of labor in 
the export sector, including direct exchange rate effects, the terms of trade, and indirect 
exchange rate effects through the credit constraints.  The right hand side just represents 
the change in the nominal wage.  
  The domestic authorities choose the optimal exchange rate rule to maximize 
domestic expected utility, which may be written as (see Woodford, 1999).    





where (1 ) NX ha h a h =+ − represents aggregate employment. We assume that the 
exchange rate rule is chosen before the external shocks are known, but that the rule 
allows the authorities to respond directly to the realizations of the shocks.   
Optimal Exchange Policy Without Credit Constraints  
First we look at the case without credit constraints, so that the risk premium term 
γ , is set to zero. We may then solve equations (6)-(8) for consumption and employment:  11 
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Substituting (9) and (10) into (the approximation of) expected utility, it is easy to then 
show that the optimal exchange rate rule is: 






=− + .                                      (11)        
  The exchange rate is adjusted to fully respond to terms of trade disturbances and 
shocks to the real price of intermediate inputs.  Intuitively, a positive shock to the terms 
of trade requires a real exchange rate appreciation.  In face of sticky non-traded goods 
prices, the real appreciation is achieved by nominal appreciation.  In fact (11) replicates 
the equilibrium of the economy where the non-traded goods price is fully flexible.    
Optimal Exchange Policy With Credit Constraints  
When the intermediate inputs sector is subject to a credit constraint, the policy 
maker must take into account that movements in the exchange rate affect the real cost of 
the intermediate input, through the response of the risk-premium.  Again using (6)-(8), 
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       (13) 
Contrasting with equations (9) and (10), we see that the effects of a terms of trade   12 
shock on consumption and employment are as before.  But exchange rate depreciation 
may have a perverse impact on aggregate consumption, since it reduces output in the 
traded goods sector, and reduces the marginal product of labor in traded goods.   
  We may use equations (12) and (13), in conjunction with the objective function, 
to derive the optimal exchange rate rule.  The optimal rule may be written as 
   [] 11 22 **
22
12
(1 ) ( ) (1 ) ( ) (1 )
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= ! .   
In general, it is not possible to determine the sign of the exchange rate response.  
When 0 γ = ,  (14) implies a full offset of shocks as in equation (11).  To explore the 
impact of the credit constraint more generally, we calibrate the model.  Let the share of 
non-traded goods in GDP be 50 percent, so a=0.5 (see Devereux and Lane (2001) for 
justification).  Assume that the share of intermediate inputs in export production is 40 
percent, so that  0.6 ω = .  Let the elasticity of labor supply be unity, so  1 ψ = .  Finally, 
following the benchmark of recent literature, let  2 σ = .  Calibrating for γ  is more 
difficult.  But from the definition given above, when the z function is assumed to be 
quadratic, there is a monotonic relationship between γ  and the risk-premium.  So we 
illustrate the optimal policy under a variety of different values for the risk premium.    
Figure 1 illustrates the dependence of the exchange rate rule on the risk premium 
under this calibration.  As the risk premium rises, the optimal exchange rate response to 
terms of trade or intermediate input price shocks falls.  At a risk-premium of 30 percent, 
the optimal exchange rate response is zero.  Thus, as the credit constraints in international 
financial markets become increasingly important, the direct benefits of adjusting the  13 
exchange rate to terms of trade shocks are offset by the indirect costs, in terms of a rising 
risk-premium (cost of intermediate inputs), which is itself sensitive to movements in the 
exchange rate.  This reduces the optimal exchange rate response to external shocks.  
Figure 1 also shows the case of σ =1.5.  In this case, because policy-makers are more 
willing to accept consumption volatility, the optimal monetary rule is more activist, and 
the risk premium at which the exchange rate response is zero rises to 60 percent
6.  
 These results thus support our view that financial market distortions may offset 
the direct stabilization properties of exchange rate policy in developing economies.  
Section 3 Data and Empirical Methodology 
We have argued that standard OCA variables should be augmented with 
consideration of financial factors in understanding the benefits and costs of exchange rate 
fluctuations, especially in regard to developing countries. Accordingly, a key part of our 
empirical approach is to introduce a measure of international financial dependence as a 
potential determinant of exchange rate volatility. 
We examine bilateral nominal exchange rate volatility for a large set of countries. 
The closest antecedent to our work is Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1998).  Bayoumi and 
Eichengreen examine the empirical determinants of bilateral exchange rate volatility for a 
group of industrial countries, focusing on standard OCA factors as explanatory variables.  
Our sample includes a wider set of countries, including developing countries.  In 
addition, we address the role played by financial linkages in determining exchange rate 
                                                 
6 These results are not sensitive to variations in the parameter values.  As long as σ is large enough 
(greater than 1.5), the policy maker will put sufficient weight on consumption variation in the objective 
function so as to reduce exchange rate variability in response to terms of trade shocks, for empirically 
plausible values of the risk-premium.   14 
volatility
7.  Larrain and Tavares (2000) and Engel and Rose (2000) consider determinants 
of real exchange volatility but again do not consider financial factors. Alternatively, 
Fernandez-Arias et al (2001) and Poirson (2001) do consider financial factors 
(specifically, the ability to issue international debt in domestic currency) but study 
multivariate exchange rate volatility and only for a limited number of countries. 
The bilateral approach is an essential part of our methodology.  First, to 
adequately assess the importance of conventional OCA theory in explaining exchange 
rate volatility, it is essential to look at pairwise volatility between countries with different 
characteristics.  But a bilateral perspective is also important for assessing the effects of 
financial interdependence, since the cost of exchange rate volatility is likely to be greater 
against those countries with which the country has substantial debts, particularly debts 
denominated in creditor country currencies. In the regressions below, we also report 
results when we restrict the analysis to a small group of creditor country/currencies.   
 Our empirical specification is to model exchange rate volatility by 
 *
ER
ij ij j ij j ij ij VOL X FIN EXTFIN FIN EXTFIN α βγ σ ρ ε =+ + + + +  
where 
ER
ij VOL  is the level of bilateral nominal exchange rate volatility between countries 
iand  j ,  ij X  is a set of standard OCA variables,  j FIN  is the size of the domestic 
                                                 
7 As in Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1998), we assume that at least part of bilateral exchange rate volatility 
can be represented as an endogenous policy choice conditioned on underlying OCA and finance-related 
variables.   An alternative would be to include some indicator of the overall ‘exchange rate regime￿.  
However, a growing recent  literature (e.g. Levy ￿Yeyati and Sturzennegger 2001, Calvo and Reinhart 
2002, Reinhart and Rogoff 2002) stresses the difficulty that arises when the degree of exchange rate 
flexibility is assigned from official classifications, due to the substantial differences between de jure 
classification and de facto exchange rate behaviour.  These papers also tend to assign exchange rate policy 
based on observed exchange rate variability.   Moreover, the bilateral dimension allows us to identify 
against which currencies country X values stability --- for a developing country, our point is that financial 
links in addition to trade links determine attitudes regarding bilateral volatility  
  15 
financial sector and  ij EXTFIN is a measure of the financial dependence of country  j  on 
country i. We measure bilateral exchange rate volatility as 
 [ (log( )]
ER
ij ij VOL STDEV d s =  
where  ij s  is the nominal exchange rate between countries iand  j .
8 This is constructed 
using monthly data over 1995.1 to 2000.9, drawn from the IMF International Financial 
Statistics CD-ROM.
9 Table 1 reports summary statistics for this variable for (i) the full 
(FULL) sample; (ii) the set of industrial (IND) countries; and (iii) the set of developing 
(DEV) countries.
10 We observe that both the mean and standard deviation of exchange 
rate volatility is much higher for the DEV sample than the IND sample. 
  Since each observation of our dependent variable is a country i, j pair, the 
question of spatial correlation between observations arises.  This might reduce the 
significance of our estimates.  As noted by Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1998) however, 
spatial correlation presents less of a problem for regressors expressed in second moment 
terms.  While the change in the exchange rate between currency i and currency j is 
correlated with the change in the i ￿ k exchange rate, this not automatically true of the 
covariance between i ￿j and  i ￿k rates.      
                                                 
8 The data appendix provides more details on data construction and sources. 
9 Measuring exchange rate volatility over a relatively short period runs the risk of  ￿peso problems￿, in 
which the results are particularly sample dependent.  However, since our data on external finance is limited 
in time, we are constrained on this dimension.  In fact, it makes little difference if we take the average over 
a longer period such as 1990.1 to 2000.9 but the more recent period allows the inclusion of more transition 
countries. For the euro-zone members, volatility after 1999.1 is equal to volatility for the euro but the 
results would be unchanged if we had measured volatility for these countries until 1998.4. 
10 The IND countries are the OECD members: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, 
Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, Sweden, United Kingdom, United States. The IND sample is the set of 
bilateral observations between the ￿creditor￿ countries in Table 2 (see below) and the industrial countries 
listed in Table 3. The DEV sample is the set of bilateral observations between the ￿creditor￿ countries in 
Table 2 (see below) and the developing countries listed in Table 3.  16 
Regarding the standard OCA variables included in the analysis, Trade is the sum 
of exports and imports between iand  j , expressed as a ratio to country  j ￿s GDP.
11 It is 
included for the standard logic that the benefit of a floating nominal exchange rate is 
inversely related to the level of trade with a given partner country. Cycle is the degree of 
business cycle asymmetry: it is the standard deviation of the growth rate differential 
between countries iand  j , measured over 1975-98.
12 This indicator is included to proxy 
for asymmetric shocks, which should increase the desirability of a flexible exchange rate 
as an adjustment mechanism. Size is the log of the product of the GDPs of iand  j . Size 
is intended to proxy for the microeconomic benefits of exchange rate stability: smaller 
countries should be more reluctant to tolerate fluctuations in the nominal exchange rate. 
  The size of the domestic financial sector Finance is measured as the ratio of liquid 
liabilities to GDP.
13 We include this proxy for domestic financial development since the 
financial frictions we emphasized in the theoretical model are likely to be less important, 
the more sophisticated is the domestic financial sector.  
We consider two measures of the financial dependence of country  j  on country 
i. In Tables 4 and 7 below, we set  ij EXTFIN ALLD =  where  ij ij ij ALLD BISAD PD =+  is 
the sum of the own-currency bank claims and the portfolio debt claims of country ion 
country  j .
14 The former is based on internal BIS data and is measured as an average over 
                                                 
11 We enter TRADE in log form. 
12 This interval is longer than the period over which we measure exchange rate volatility but we only have 
annual data for GDP. We obtain similar results if we calculate Cycle over 1990-98. 
13 This measure is the most widely available indicator of financial development. Other indicators such as 
the ratio of private credit to GDP or stock market activity are available only for a smaller number of 
countries. 
14 We enter EXTFIN  in the form of log(1 / ) j EXTFIN GDP + .  This takes into account the presence 
of zero values for EXTFIN  and facilitates the specification for the instrumental-variables estimation  17 
1995.1 to 2000.12; the latter is taken from the International Monetary Fund￿s 
International Portfolio Survey and is measured at end-1997.
15 As such, this variable is a 
broad measure of the debt liabilities owed by country  j  to country i. However, the IMF 
data on portfolio debt holdings do not identify the currency denomination of these claims. 
This is a limitation: for instance, most Latin American bond debt is denominated in US 
dollars while the industrial nations bonds are often denominated in domestic currency.
16  
For this reason, we try an alternative measure in Tables 5 and 8 by setting 
ij EXTFIN BISAD =  in Tables 5 and 8. By focusing only on bank claims, this permits the 
inclusion of a greater number of data points and consists entirely of own-currency 
loans.
17 This may better capture the notion of foreign-currency liabilities: if country X 
borrows money from country Y but in the currency of country Z, then country X may 
care more about exchange rate stability vis-￿-vis country Z than country Y. By looking at 
just own-currency liabilities, we restrict attention to debts owed by country X to country 
Y in the currency of country Y.  
We include the interaction term Extfin*Finance since we expect external financial 
dependence to be less relevant for exchange rate policy, the more sophisticated the 
domestic financial sector --- recall that external financing only matters in our theoretical 
model if financial frictions (the risk premium) are important. 
                                                                                                                                                 
procedure that we describe below.  Unfortunately, we do not know the currency breakdown of portfolio 
debts. 
15 We convert both variables into constant 1995 US dollars. 
16 Since our model suggests the importance of foreign currency liabilities in affecting the risk-premium,  we 
would ideally like data on the aggregate amounts of portfolio debt owed by each country in each currency.  
But we do not currently have such data. The IMF data are based on surveys of the creditor countries: it is 
possible that there is variation across reporting countries in terms of the quality of the information but this 
should not vary systematically across the debtor countries. 
17 Importantly, restricting attention to bank debt permits the inclusion of Germany as a creditor country (the 
IMF Portfolio Survey does not include Germany). For the United Kingdom, BISAD refers to all-currency  18 
We include GDP per capita (in PPP units) as an extra control variable. This is 
intended as a general check for potential omitted variable bias, since external finance may 
systematically vary with the level of development and so may just proxy for other 
economic and institutional developments associated with a rising per capita income. 
Trade, Cycle and Extfin are potentially endogenous to exchange rate volatility. For this 
reason, we report instrumental-variables estimates in subsection 4.2 below.  
Section 4: Empirical Results 
4.1 OLS Estimation 
We begin with a basic specification in Table 4, with Extfin=Alld.  The full sample 
is included in column (1); the IND subsample in column (2); and the DEV subsample in 
column (3). Further splits of the DEV subsample are considered in columns (4)-(6): only 
observations vis-￿-vis the major currencies (US, UK, Japan, France, Germany) are 
included in columns (4)-(6); observations with Alld=0 are further excluded in columns 
(5)-(6); observations with mean bilateral depreciation rates above 3 percent are yet 
further excluded in column (6). 
  Across columns (1)-(6), the standard OCA variables work reasonably well: in 
particular, Trade and Size have the expected signs. The latter is always significant but the 
former does not reach standard significance levels for some of the DEV country 
subsamples in columns (4)-(5). For the IND sample, Cycle has the expected sign and is 
quite significant; for the FULL and DEV samples, it is actually significantly negative.
18  
                                                                                                                                                 
debt, since this country does not separately report the domestic-currency component. The data should be 
reasonably uniform, since these are based on information from BIS-reporting banks. 
18 The simple correlation between Cycle and Vol is quite positive at 0.43, 0.47, 0.41 for the FULL, IND and 
DEV samples respectively, suggesting that the negative sign for the FULL and DEV sample regressions is 
the result of collinearity with the other regressors.  19 
For the IND sample, Finance enters with a significantly positive coefficient: more 
financially sophisticated industrial countries are able to tolerate a higher level of 
exchange rate volatility, all else equal. However, Finance is actually significantly 
negative for the FULL and DEV samples. Among the developing countries, this suggests 
that domestic financial development helps to stabilize the exchange rate, for instance by 
facilitating intertemporal smoothing by households and firms or adding liquidity to 
financial markets (including the foreign exchange market).  
  A sharp difference between the IND and DEV countries is also evident for the 
Extfin variable. For the FULL and DEV samples, Extfin has a significantly negative 
association with exchange rate volatility. In contrast, Extfin is actually significantly 
positive for the IND countries. This pattern in fact broadly matches our theoretical priors. 
Financial frictions are more important in developing countries than in the industrial 
nations and, as in our theoretical model, the former group will do more to minimize 
exchange rate fluctuations, the greater the reliance on external finance. That Extfin is 
positive for the IND sample is consistent with the idea that industrial countries most 
active in international asset trade are best placed to absorb a more volatile exchange rate. 
  The behavior of the interaction term Extfin*Finance provides further supporting 
evidence. The interaction term is significantly positive for the FULL and DEV samples: 
the greater is domestic financial depth (the smaller are financial frictions), the less 
important is external financial dependence in determining the appropriate exchange rate 
policy. The interaction term is actually negative for the IND sample, suggesting again an 
underlying nonlinearity in the relation.  20 
With respect to economic magnitude of the impact of external financial 
dependence on bilateral exchange rate volatility, we take the point estimates for the direct 
and interaction effects in column (6) of Table 4 for illustrative purposes. Taking a 
country-pair with a level of bilateral exchange rate volatility equal to the subsample mean 
of 4 percent, a five percentage  point increase in the ratio of external liabilities of country 
j  vis-a-vis country i (as a fraction of GDP) implies a decline in volatility to 2.86 percent 
if Finance=0.25 but an increase in volatility to 4.79 percent if Finance=0.75.
19 This is an 
intuitive partition: for developing countries with weak domestic financial systems, higher 
external liabilities is associated with lower exchange rate volatility. For countries with 
stronger financial systems, the relation even turns positive. 
Additional explanatory power is provided by GDP per capita for the FULL and 
DEV samples: richer countries tend to have more stable exchange rates. Again, this effect 
is not important if we confine attention to the IND sample. Finally, we note that the 
overall explanatory power is relatively poorer for the developing country subsample than 
for the industrial nations. 
Table 5 repeats the analysis for the second measure of external financial 
dependence: Extfin=Bisad. As noted, more observations are available for this measure 
and it also permits the inclusion of Germany among the creditor countries. The downside 
is now that only bank liabilities are considered. However, in contrast to the portfolio debt 
data, at least we know that these bank liabilities are denominated in the currency of the  
                                                 
19 The turning-point in the relation between external finance and bilateral volatility is at Finance=0.55. 
(The subsample median value of Finance is 0.35. ) The turning point when we use the alternative measure 
of external finance (EXTFIN=BISAD) is 0.68 (column (6) of Table 5).  The IV estimates in Tables 7-8 for 
the sample specifications give turning points of 0.52 and 0.71.  21 
creditor country.
20 This is closer to the type of financial liability that should matter for 
currency behavior, according to our theoretical model. The results are very similar to 
Table 4. The main exceptions are that Trade is now significant  for the DEV subsamples 
(at the 5 or 10 percent levels) and Cycle is no longer significant for these subsamples. 
4.2 IV Estimation 
As noted earlier, the OLS results may not be reliable if some of the regressors are 
endogenously determined by the level of bilateral exchange rate volatility. We consider 
four variables to be potentially affected by this problem: Trade, Cycle, Extfin and the 
interaction term Extfin*Finance.  Our instruments for these three variables are: 
log(distance) and its square;  a common language dummy; a colonial dummy; a regional 
trade agreement dummy; log(GDP) and its square for home and partner countries; and 
log(GDP per capita) for home and partner countries.  Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1998) 
use a similar list in instrumenting for Trade and Cycle  --- the recent literature on ￿gravity 
and capital flows￿ suggest that these are also good instruments for Extfin.
21  
As a prelude to the instrumental-variables estimation, Table 5 investigates the 
relevance of the instrument list. Shea (1997) provides a methodology for investigating 
relevance when there are multiple potentially endogenous regressors.
22 Following this 
approach, we regress each regressor  1 X  on the instrument vector Z. We calculate  1 ￿ X  as 
the fitted value. We also regress each  1 X  on the other regressors , X to form the residual 
1 X ! . We next regress  1 ￿ X  on  ￿ X , where  ￿ X  are the fitted values for the other regressors, to 
                                                 
20 With the exception of the United Kingdom, as already noted. 
21 On the determinants of bilateral financial relations, see Buch (2001), Ghosh and Wolf (2001), Honohan 
and Lane (2000), Kawai and Liu (2001), Portes and Rey (2001) and Warnock and Mason (2001).  22 
form the residual  X . We report the partial R2 from a regression of  1 X !  on  1 X  and an F-
test for the significance of  1 X  in explaining  1 X ! .  
The results in Table 6 show that the F-tests are always significant for the four 
endogenous regressors across the various samples, even if the partial R2 values are 
relatively low in a number of cases. Across the subsamples, the partial R2 values are 
typically highest for Trade and lowest for Cycle.  Shea (1997) does not provide a formal 
methodology for establishing a threshold level of acceptability for the partial R2 value. 
However, the low values in some cases suggest the need to improve the identification of 
the endogenous regressors,  to better establish lines of causality.  This mixed evidence on 
instrument relevance indicates that the IV results should be interpreted with due caution. 
The IV results are given in Tables 7-8. Estimation is by GMM with White-
corrected standard errors. The J-statistics are typically insignificant, implying that the 
overidentifying restrictions tests are not rejected.
23 At a qualitative level, the results are 
broadly similar to those in Tables 4-5. Given our focus, we note that magnitude of the 
coefficient estimates for Extfin is increased for the developing country subsample in 
columns (3) - (6).
24  The results in Table 8 are of particular interest.  Comparing columns 
(3) with (4), we find that for IND countries, exchange rate volatility is determined by 
conventional OCA variables alone.  But for DEV countries, both Finance and Extfin play 
a critical role in explaining exchange rate volatility, in addition to the OCA variables 
                                                                                                                                                 
22 When there is a single endogenous regressor, instrument relevance can be shown by reporting the R2 or 
F-test for the first-stage regression. For each of our candidate endogenous regressors, these first-stage 
regressions have quite strong explanatory power. 
23 The only exception is for the IND country sample in column (2) of Table 8. Our primary focus is on the 
DEV subsamples. 
24 That the IV result for EXTFIN is stronger than the OLS estimate is indeed consistent with a reverse 
causality channel running from the level of exchange rate volatility to the degree of international asset 
trade. A similar point applies for the increased coefficient estimate for TRADE.  23 
Trade and Size.  Again, as suggested by the theory, volatility is negatively significantly 
negatively related to Extfin. 
Overall, the results support the contention that both financial factors and OCA 
variable play a role in determining bilateral exchange rate volatility. Moreover, financial 
dependence matters for the emerging market economies but not for the rich economies 
that have stronger balance sheets and are able to issue debt in domestic currency.  
Section 5. Conclusions 
Rather than repeating our results, here we emphasize some of the outstanding 
questions raised by our analysis.  We have stressed some of the limitations of the 
empirical results arising from the lack of data.  For instance, as emphasized in footnotes 8 
and 10, we must attribute at least part of observed bilateral exchange rate volatility to 
policy decisions.  In addition, we must remain concerned about endogeneity in 
explanatory variables. In future work, it would be useful to further investigate the link 
between international financial linkages and exchange rate behavior. In this regard, 
examining the role of finance in determining exchange rate regime decisions (de jure and 
de facto) and considering alternative measures of volatility would be interesting. Data 
permitting, it would also be desirable to examine volatility over longer time spans, and to 
find better instruments for bilateral financial trade in order to minimize endogeneity 
concerns. Related to this point, the forthcoming publication of the second IMF Portfolio 
Survey will provide new financial data that may permit a panel estimation approach. 
Although our empirical results are preliminary, the findings so far suggest that 
economists may have to extend the list of variables important for understanding bilateral 
exchange rate volatility beyond those suggest by traditional optimal currency area theory.   24 
Data Appendix 
 
Nominal Exchange Rate Volatility: Standard deviation of the log first difference of the 
bilateral exchange rate over 1995.1-2000.9. Source: IMF￿s International Financial 
Statistics CD-ROM. 
 
Trade: Ratio of bilateral exports and imports relative to host country  j ￿s GDP in 1997. 
Source: IMF￿s Direction of Trade Statistics CD-ROM. 
 
Cycle: Standard deviation of  it jt GROWTH GROWTH − , where output growth is the log 
first difference of GDP (in PPP terms) over 1990-1998. Source: World Bank￿s World 
Development Indicators CD-ROM. 
 
Size: ( * ) ij Log GDP GDP  in constant US dollars in 1995. Source: World Bank￿s World 
Development Indicators CD-ROM. 
 
Finance: Ratio of liquid liabilities to GDP in host country  j  in 1995. Source: Beck,  and 
Levine (2001) dataset. Available online from World Bank website. 
 
BISAD: Own-currency bank claims of country i on country  j , in constant dollars over 
1995.1 to 2000.4. Augmented by all-currency bank claims of the United Kingdom on 
country  j . Expressed as a ratio to host country  j ￿s GDP. Source: Bank of International 
Settlements, by permission. 
 
PD:  Long-term debt securities of country  j  held by country i, at end 1997. Expressed 
as a ratio to host country  j ￿s GDP. Source: IMF￿s Results of the 1997 Coordinated 
Portfolio Investment Survey. 
 
ALLD: Sum of BISAD and PD. 
 
GDP per capita: GDP per capita, in PPP terms for 1995. Source: World Bank￿s World 
Development Indicators CD-ROM. 
 
DIST: Log of bilateral distance. Source: http://www.haas.berkeley.edu/~arose 
 
COMLANG: Common language dummy. Source: http://www.haas.berkeley.edu/~arose, 
augmented by CIA World Factbook. 
 
COLONIAL: Dummy for colonial relationship. Source: 
http://www.haas.berkeley.edu/~arose, augmented by CIA World Factbook. 
 
RTA: Dummy for common membership of a regional trade agreement. Source: 
http://www.haas.berkeley.edu/~arose, augmented by data on WTO website. 
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Table 1. Exchange Rate Volatility: Summary Statistics 
 FULL  IND  DEV 
Mean 4.21  2.04  4.59 
St. Dev  5.99  1.06  45.4 
N 3026  442  2584 
Exchange rate volatility is measured as the standard deviation of the log first difference 
of the bilateral exchange rate over 1995.1-2000.9. The IND countries are the OECD 
members: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, 
Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, Sweden, United Kingdom, United States. Source: IMF￿s 
International Financial Statistics CD-ROM. 
Table 1. Exchange Rate Volatility: Summary Statistics 
 FULL  IND  DEV 
Mean 4.21  2.04  4.59 
St. Dev  5.99  1.06  45.4 
N 3026  442  2584 
Exchange rate volatility is measured as the standard deviation of the log first difference 
of the bilateral exchange rate over 1995.1-2000.9. The IND countries are the OECD 
members: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, 
Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, Sweden, United Kingdom, United States. Source: IMF￿s 
International Financial Statistics CD-ROM. 
Table 2. List of Creditor Countries 
United States, United Kingdom, Japan, France, Germany, Austria, Belgium, Ireland, 
Italy, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Finland, Hong Kong 
Portfolio debt data missing for Germany, Hong Kong. 
σ =2 
σ =1.5  30 
 




UNITED STATES SPAIN URUGUAY SAUDI ARABIA
UNITED KINGDOM TURKEY VENEZUELA SYRIA
AUSTRIA AUSTRALIA BARBADOS UAE
DENMARK NEW ZEALAND DOMINICA EGYPT
FRANCE SOUTH AFRICA GRENADA AFGHANISTAN
GERMANY BOLIVIA GUYANA BANGLADESH
SAN MARINO BRAZIL BELIZE BHUTAN
ITALY CHILE JAMAICA BRUNEI DAR.
NETHERLANDS COLOMBIA ST. LUCIA MYANMAR
NORWAY COSTA RICA ST. VINCENT CAMBODIA
SWEDEN DOMINICAN REP. SURINAME SRI LANKA
SWITZERLAND ECUADOR TRIN.&TOBAGO TAIWAN
CANADA EL SALVADOR CYPRUS INDIA
JAPAN GUATEMALA IRAN INDONESIA
FINLAND HAITI IRAQ KOREA
GREECE HONDURAS ISRAEL LAOS
ICELAND MEXICO JORDAN MALAYSIA
IRELAND NICARAGUA KUWAIT MALDIVES
MALTA PARAGUAY OMAN NEPAL
PORTUGAL PERU QATAR PAKISTAN
PHILIPPINES GHANA SIERRA LEONE TAJIKISTAN
THAILAND GUINEA-BISSAU SUDAN CHINA
VIETNAM GUINEA SWAZILAND TURKMENISTAN
DJIBOUTI COTE D IVOIRE TANZANIA UKRAINE
ALGERIA KENYA TOGO UZBEKISTAN
ANGOLA LESOTHO TUNISIA CZECH REPUBLIC
BOTSWANA LIBYA UGANDA SLOVAK REPUBLI
BURUNDI MADAGASCAR BURKINA FASO ESTONIA
CAMEROON MALI ZAMBIA LATVIA
CAPE VERDE MAURITANIA SOLOMON ISL HUNGARY
CENT. AFR. REP. MAURITIUS FIJI LITHUANIA
CHAD MOROCCO KIRIBATI MONGOLIA
COMOROS MOZAMBIQUE PAPUA NG CROATIA
CONGO, REP. NIGER ARMENIA SLOVENIA
CONGO, DEM. REP NIGERIA ALBANIA MACEDONIA
BENIN ZIMBABWE GEORGIA BOSNIA&HERZ.
EQ. GUINEA RWANDA KAZAKHSTAN POLAND
ETHIOPIA SAO TOME KYRGYZ REPUBLIC ROMANIA
GABON SEYCHELLES BULGARIA
GAMBIA, THE SENEGAL RUSSIA 31 
Table 4. Volatility Regressions I. OLS Estimation. 
 
 
Note: EXTFIN=ALLD. OLS estimation, with White-corrected standard errors. t-statistics 
in parentheses. Full sample in column (1); Rich country sample in column (2); 
Developing country sample in columns (3)-(6). Only observations vis-￿-vis the major 
currencies (US, UK, Japan, France, Germany) included in columns (4)-(6);observations 
with EXTFIN=0 further excluded in columns (5)-(6); observations with mean 
depreciation rates above 3 percent further excluded in column (6). ***, **, * denote 1%, 
5% and 10% levels of significance. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
C -0.1 -0.12 -0.14 -0.14 -0.15 -0.18
(5.7)*** (4.6)*** (6.4)*** (3.11)*** (2.97)*** (3.1)***
Trade -0.2 -0.22 -0.2 -0.22 -0.3 -0.38
(4.04)*** (4.14)*** (3.74)*** (1.36) (1.52) (1.83)*
Cycle -0.05 0.49 -0.09 -0.09 -0.11 -0.15
(2.33)** (5.41)*** (4.1)*** (1.99)** (2.23)** (2.84)***
Size 0.41 0.27 0.45 0.44 0.48 0.55
(9.9)*** (7.8)*** (9.45)*** (4.11)*** (4.17)*** (3.93)***
Finance -0.018 0.004 -0.026 -0.034 -0.038 -0.004
(6.39)*** (2.7)*** (6.11)*** (3.52)*** (3.48)*** (3.1)***
Extfin -0.26 0.14 -0.37 -0.4 -0.44 -0.42
(3.16)*** (2.25)** (3.43)*** (3.02)*** (3.07)*** (2.88)***
Extfin 0.24 -0.1 0.5 0.63 0.76 0.77
*Finance (2.24)** (1.42) (2.64)*** (2.73)*** (2.97)*** (2.84)***
GDP -0.85 -0.35 -0.53 -0.45 -0.64 -0.67
per capita (7.73)*** (1.29) (4.01)*** (1.71)* (1.92)* (1.82)*
R2 0.15 0.43 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.17
N 1087 198 889 250 209 186 32 
Table 5.  Volatility Regressions II. OLS Estimation. 
 
Note: EXTFIN=BISAD. OLS estimation, with White-corrected standard errors. t-
statistics in parentheses. Full sample in column (1); Rich country sample in column (2); 
Developing country sample in columns (3)-(6). Only observations vis-￿-vis the major 
currencies (US, UK, Japan, France, Germany) included in columns (4)-(6);observations 
with EXTFIN=0 further excluded in columns (5)-(6); observations with mean 
depreciation rates above 3 percent further excluded in column (6). ***, **, * denote 1%, 
5% and 10% levels of significance.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
C -0.1 -0.09 -0.14 -0.15 -0.17 -0.19
(6.5)*** (3.5)*** (7.3)*** (4.7)*** (4.5)*** (4.5)***
Trade -0.23 -0.22 -0.22 -0.21 -0.24 -0.29
(5.3)*** (5.3)*** (4.6)*** (1.8)* (1.8)* (2.1)**
Cycle -0.04 0.37 -0.08 -0.04 -0.03 -0.04
(2.42)*** (5.7)*** (4.4)*** (1.4) (1.0) (1.2)
Size 0.39 0.25 0.45 0.46 0.53 0.58
(11.4)*** (7.9)*** (10.9)*** (6.0)*** (5.8)*** (5.6)***
Finance -0.017 0.003 -0.024 -0.025 -0.029 -0.028
(7.3)*** (2.4)** (7.1)*** (4.2)*** (4.2)*** (3.9)***
Extfin -0.18 0.035 -0.26 -0.26 -0.28 -0.27
(3.0)*** (1.3) (3.1)*** (2.8)*** (2.8)*** (2.7)***
Extfin 0.2 0.5 0.32 0.31 0.39 0.4
*Finance (3.3)*** (0.2) (3.0)*** (2.85)*** (2.8)*** (2.7)***
GDP -0.86 -0.41 -0.58 -0.55 -0.75 -0.82
per capita (9.2)*** (1.8)* (5.2)*** (2.7)*** (3.1)*** (3.1)***
R2 0.14 0.36 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.15
N 1560 279 1281 443 377 349 33 
Table 6. Relevance of the Instrumental Variables 
 
Note: Following Shea (1997), we regress each regressor  1 X  on the instrument vector Z. 
We calculate  1 ￿ X  as the fitted value. We also regress each  1 X  on the other regressors  X , 
to form the residual  1 X ! . We next regress  1 ￿ X  on  ￿ X , where  ￿ X  are the fitted values for the 
other regressors, to form the residual 1 X . We report the partial R2 from a regression of 
1 X !  on 1 X  and an F-test for the significance of  1 X  in explaining  1 X ! . 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
TRADE CYCLE EXTFIN EXTFIN*FIN
ALLDY,FULL Partial R2 0.29 0.06 0.06 0.05
F-statistic 364.2 56.1 45.6 55.5
ALLDY,DEV Partial R2 0.32 0.03 0.12 0.13
F-statistic 340.4 97.5 104.7 19.0
BISADY,FULL Partial R2 0.11 0.02 0.02 0.01
F-statistic 165.1 24.9 11.2 29.9
BISADY,DEV Partial R2 0.24 0.02 0.03 0.02
F-statistic 219.0 32.9 20.0 17.3 34 
Table 7. Volatility Regressions III. IV Estimation. 
Note: EXTFIN=ALLD. IV-GMM estimation, with White-corrected standard errors. t-
statistics in parentheses. J-statistic is test of overidentifying restrictions (p-values in 
parentheses). Full sample in column (1); Rich country sample in column (2); Developing 
country sample in columns (3)-(6). Only observations vis-￿-vis the major currencies (US, 
UK, Japan, France, Germany) included in columns (4)-(6);observations with EXTFIN=0 
further excluded in columns (5)-(6); observations with mean depreciation rates above 3 
percent further excluded in column (6). ***, **, * denote 1%, 5% and 10% levels of 
significance.  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
C -0.28 -0.08 -0.33 -0.18 -0.16 -0.15
(6.5)*** (1.0) (6.74)*** (2.8)*** (2.2)** (1.63)
Trade -0.27 -0.49 -0.49 -0.38 -0.39 -0.64
(2.1)** (1.3) (3.49)*** (0.72) (0.62) (0.9)
Cycle 0.81 -0.1 0.63 0.23 0.116 -0.39
(4.6)*** (0.2) (2.45)** (0.85) (0.29) (0.51)
Size 0.63 0.17 0.74 0.44 0.46 0.48
(9.2)*** (0.91) (8.72)*** (3.39)*** (3.26)*** (2.88)***
Finance -0.031 0.04 -0.039 -0.059 -0.071 -0.083
(3.92)*** (2.1)** (4.12)*** (2.99)*** (2.9)*** (2.48)**
Extfin -1.9 4.1 -2.0 -1.16 -1.39 -1.39
(3.41)*** (2.45)** (3.55)*** (2.46)*** (2.63)** (2.63)***
Extfin 2.91 -5.12 3.82 2.05 2.51 2.66
*Finance (3.26)*** (2.21)** (3.1)*** (2.35)** (2.43)** (2.32)**
GDP -0.49 -0.48 -0.58 -0.07 -0.35 -0.34
per capita (2.56)** (0.78) (3.21)*** (0.23) (0.81) (0.70)
J-statistic 8.83 7.57 5.44 8.44 9.86 9.02
(0.64) (0.67) (0.91) (0.49) (0.36) (0.44)
N 901 194 707 222 186 164 35 
Table 8. Volatility Regressions III. IV Estimation. 
Note: EXTFIN=BISAD. IV-GMM estimation, with White-corrected standard errors. t-
statistics in parentheses. J-statistic is test of overidentifying restrictions (p-values in 
parentheses). Full sample in column (1); Rich country sample in column (2); Developing 
country sample in columns (3)-(6). Only observations vis-￿-vis the major currencies (US, 
UK, Japan, France, Germany) included in columns (4)-(6);observations with EXTFIN=0 
further excluded in columns (5)-(6); observations with mean depreciation rates above 3 




(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
C -0.24 -0.17 -0.29 -0.2 -0.2 -0.21
(4.1)*** (3.3)*** (6.1)*** (3.49)*** (3.0)*** (3.0)***
Trade -0.23 -0.57 -0.43 -0.55 -0.27 -0.36
(1.04) (1.9)* (2.0)** (1.72)* (0.71) (0.94)
Cycle 0.56 0.93 0.48 0.21 0.14 0.025
(2.55)** (5.28)*** (1.6) (0.86) (0.44) (0.07)
Size 0.6 0.41 0.7 0.48 0.58 0.58
(6.54)*** (5.48)*** (8.45)*** (4.18)*** (3.76)*** (3.4)***
Finance -0.03 -0.013 -0.048 -0.051 -0.072 -0.066
(2.44)** (1.58) (3.66)*** (2.58)** (2.74)*** (2.13)**
Extfin -2.03 -0.13 -2.49 -1.03 -1.67 -1.48
(2.51)** (0.25) (3.06)*** (1.76)* (2.35)** (1.99)**
Extfin 2.83 0.81 4.63 1.55 2.44 2.07
*Finance (1.7)* (0.89) (2.19)** (1.51) (1.89)* (1.52)
GDP -0.61 -0.82 -0.68 -0.27 -0.55 -0.50
per capita (4.22)*** (1.76)* (4.12)*** (1.01) (1.52) (1.29)
J-statistic 15.85 26.4 15.69 14.28 13.86 15.76
(0.15) (0.003) (0.153) (0.161) (0.18) (0.11)
N 1321 275 1046 386 330 303